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Abstract
We consider a setting where a verifier with limited computation power delegates a resource
intensive computation task—which requires a T ×S computation tableau—to two provers where
the provers are rational in that each prover maximizes their own payoff—taking into account
losses incurred by the cost of computation. We design a mechanism called the Minimal Refereed
Mechanism (MRM) such that if the verifier has O(logS+log T ) time and O(logS+log T ) space
computation power, then both provers will provide a honest result without the verifier putting
any effort to verify the results. The amount of computation required for the provers (and thus
the cost) is a multiplicative logS-factor more than the computation itself, making this schema
efficient especially for low-space computations.
1 Introduction
The growing number of computationally intensive tasks has led to the delegation of computation
to “computing as a service” platforms such as Amazon’s EC2, Microsoft’s Azure, etc. This enables
users with widely varying loads to only pay for the computation they need. This mirrors a larger
trend to out-source: Uber (car as a service), Amazon Turk (computer plugged in worker), etc. When
outsourcing tasks, some labors may perform the task honestly due to their intrinsic preference for
honesty; however, often labors need incentives which encourage them to dutifully perform the task.
If the requester has ability to (cheaply) verify the completion of tasks, the incentive problem can
be solved naturally by only providing payment for satisfactory results. However, in the case of
outsourcing computation, the verifier cannot necessarily verify the task’s completion. What should
an incentive system look like for outsourcing computation?
Motivated by the need for verifiable computations, recent results have drawn on the work of
interactive proof systems (IP)—where a resource-limited verifier can verify an extremely complicated
proof provided by a untrusted prover—as main ingredients. However, the classical IP work diverges
from the outsourced computation application in two ways: (1) in the crowdsourcing setting, the
cost an honest prover incurs in performing the proof must be taken into consideration, while in
the classical IP, the honest prover may suffer a heavy (and uncompensated) burden in proving
her result; (2) in the crowdsourcing setting provers can be assumed rational rather than merely
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untrusted, while the classical IP setting work does not assume or make use of the rationality of the
prover.
Several works (e.g. [1, 28, 12]) either take point (1) or (2) into consideration. But few works
consider the both divergences. In this paper, we consider the relation between the related IP work
and outsourced computation applications. We take the effort of the provers into consideration,
and provide a mechanism—that we call the Minimal Refereed Mechanism— which harnesses the
rationality of provers in that it is individual rational, and has the truthful computation as the only
equilibrium. In particular, this means that our protocol is robust against agents communicating,
as long as they cannot make binding commitments to one another (for example, to redistributing
the payoffs in the future). Moreover, an honest prover always obtains a positive utility even if her
opposite is irrational. While our mechanism requires that the verifier can perform a computation
requiring O(logS + log T ) time and space, in equilibrium, the verifier need only check the equality
of answers.
Each prover that faithfully follows our mechanism must spend a factor of log(S) more computa-
tional effort than is required to simply run the computation. This, of course, must be compensated
by the verifier. However, in the case where the verifier has many different processes to run, we can
reduce this overhead by a factor of nearly two. Instead of having two provers run every program,
the vast majority will only be run by one prover.
A key ingredient in the construction of the minimal refereed mechanism is from the “prisoner
dilemma”. When provers are paid based on whether they have the same output, they may collude
to obtain agreement without exerting any effort. To solve the “collusion” problem, our minimal
refereed mechanism pays an agent who betrays the collusion and tells the truth a large reward. We
also draw on techniques form IP so that the verification is possible with dramatically fewer resources
than the computation itself requires.
1.1 Related Work
Outsourced computation literature The most closely related works in this area to the current
paper are Belenkiy et al. [5], Dong et al. [14]. We all implement the idea of the “prisoner dilemma”
in outsourced computation. Dong et al. [14] also employ smart contract to implement the “prisoner
dilemma” based outsourced computation. However, Belenkiy et al. [5], Dong et al. [14] require
that the verifier has the ability to run the program by himself and infrequently performs the whole
computation to verify the correctness of the prover’s output. Our work only requires that the
verifier has the ability to perform a simple O(log T + logS) time arbitration process when the
provers disagree where the computation size is T × S.
Canetti et al. [12] also designs a O(log T + logS) time process where a verifier can determine
which prover is honest with the help of Merkle hash tree. However, they do not make use of the
rationality of the provers but instead assume one of the provers must be honest.
Conceptually, our paper combines the results of the two aforementioned works. However, naively
combining them does not work. Game theory and computation are notoriously tricky to combine [23,
24]. For example, our results do not yield a dominant strategy equilibrium as those of Belenkiy
et al. [5], and using a collision resistant hash function as in Canetti et al. [12] seems not to be
enough for our setting. We carefully integrate the two ideas, and, moreover, provide a delicate
game theoretical analysis to show that rational provers must be honest even if the arbitration
process gives an arbitrary answer when both of them are dishonest.
Interactive Proof (IP) literature Since the seminal work of Goldwasser et al. [18] and Babai
and Moran [3] introducing interactive proofs (IP), a host of results in closely related models have
2
followed (see, e.g., [7, 19, 20, 4]). In the classical model (e.g. Lund et al. [27], Shamir [29]), a verifier
with limited computation power has the ability to verify statements provided by a untrustworthy
prover with unlimited computation power. This desirable property makes IP work as an important
ingredient in many outsourced computation applications. However, in the classical IP work, the
verifier usually employs an arithmetization method that imposes a heavy computational burden on
the prover even when the prover is honest. Moreover, the classical IP work always considers the
worst case—the prover is an adversary.
Azar and Micali [1] assume that the prover is rational. With this assumption, Azar and Micali
[1] show that the verifier can easily incentivize a rational prover to provide the answer of ]SAT
in the following manner: the verifier asks the prover to report ]SAT2n which can be seen as the
prover’s prediction for the event that a randomly chosen assignment is satisfied. The verifier uses a
tool called proper scoring rules [8, 17] to measure the accuracy of the prover’s prediction via only
one sample and pays the prover the score of the accuracy. For a SAT instance with n variables,
uniformly randomly picking an assignment, the assignment is satisfied with probability ]SAT2n , and
so a property of proper scoring rule implies that the prover should provide the exact value of ]SAT2n
to maximize her expected payment. This clever design works with the assumption that the prover
can obtain the exact answer without any effort. However, in real life applications, the exponential
precision required in some of the reports is very costly to provide. This influential work has been
extended to work for different complexity classes, to improve the efficiency of the verifier, to improve
the efficiency of the prover, and to the setting with multiple computation tasks [2, 9, 10, 11, 21, 22].
However, while this line of work does explicitly have incentives, the costs of computation are ignored
while computing these incentives (however, see Sect. 3 in [9]).
Several works successfully design an interactive proof system where the computational resources
of both the verifier and honest prover run are limited, but they do not take the rationality of the
prover into consideration. The most closely related work in this area to the current paper are
refereed games [15] and doubly efficient IP [28]. The arbitration process in the current paper is
designed based on the idea of the refereed game in Feige and Kilian [15]. However, [15] do not
make use of the rationality of provers and still put a heavy burden on the honest prover. Reingold
et al. [28] designs a doubly efficient and constant-round interactive proofs for languages that have a
unique witness—if x ∈ L there exists a unique witness y, of polynomial size, that attests to this. In
their proof system the verifier runs in linear time with respect to |y|, and the honest provers run in
polynomial time with respect to |y|. However, if we do not have better than polynomial bound of
|y| in terms of |x| this tells us little about the required run time of verifier. Note that the prover’s
polynomial time bound does not account for the time it takes the prover to find |y|, which could
be super-polynomial, if L is a hard language (e.g. L 6∈ P ). Reingold et al. [28] do not explicitly
take the rationality into consideration. Moreover, even if we use the prisoner dilemma technique to
modify Reingold et al. [28] to a mechanism where the verifier does not need to spend effort when
the provers are rational, that modified mechanism still requires the verifier has the ability to run
a linear time verification (in the size of |y|), while our mechanism only requires a sublinear time
verification in |x| (as long as the computation itself is computable in subexponential time).
Kalai and Yang [25] update this work to include various additional settings such as making the
computation publicly verifiable (while keeping the result private), non-interactive, and employing
standard cryptographic assumptions. Moreover, their work applies to polynomial computation
rather than NP computations. The running time required by the verifier is still polynomially
related (T ) to the actual running time of the delegated computation T , and the verifier incurs an
additional polynomial overhead.
The aforementioned Canetti et al. [12] uses interactive proofs with multiple provers to design
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schemes with increased efficiency. Canetti et al. [13] extends this line of results to be more efficient
and apply to more realistic architectures (instead of Turing Machines), but both assume one honest
prover.
Gennaro et al. [16] gives a construction that allows the outsourcing of a single function for
multiple inputs, a different setting that considered here. The verifier’s need for computational
power scales linearly with the output size of the computation by cleverly employing techniques from
Yao’s garbled circuit and fully-homomorphic encryption.
Teutsch and Reitwießner [30] produce a white paper for TrueBit, a system which allows out-
sourced computation via smart contracts for the digital currency Ethereum. The system allows
users to post computations with a reward for the answer. A user proposing to have solved the
computation must also post a bounty. The proposed answer then can be challenged by any user. A
challenge results in an arbitration process where the solver must prove the validity of her solution. If
she fails, she loses her bounty. If no successful challenge occurs before a deadline, the solver collects
the original reward and reclaims her bounty. Unfortunately, in the equilibrium, agents should shirk
the task and report randomly with a small probability.
2 Preliminaries
Consider the scenario where a verifier wants to solve a question q and has program M that can
solve the question. The verifier, however, only has limited computational power and cannot run
the code by himself. Therefore, the verifier gives the program to two agents: Alice and Bob. In
this paper, we design a mechanism for the verifier which collects reports from Alice and Bob, and
rewards them based on their reports in a way that incentivizes both agents to faithfully execute the
program. In this section, we first review cryptographical hash functions and the Merkle hash tree
which are used by our mechanism, and then discuss the mechanism design goals.
2.1 Merkle Hash Tree H(T ) of Computation Table T
In our setting, Alice and Bob use the same code M to solve q if both of them are honest. We
assume the programM requires at most time T and space S.
Definition 1 (computation table). The computation table T of a Turing machineM that calculates
question q is a T × S matrix. The first row encodes the input and initial configuration ofM. Each
row has an active region around where the read/write head ofM is located. The last non-blank row
has only one non-blank entry—the answer of question q.
Definition 2 (hash function [26]). A hash function (with output length `) is a pair of probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, H) satisfying the following:
• Gen is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1n and outputs a
key k. We assume that 1n is implicit in k.
• H takes as input a key k and a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a string Hk(x) ∈ {0, 1}`(n)
(where n is the value of the security parameter implicit in s).
We call Hk(x) the hash value of x.
A standard property that a hash function (Gen, H) has is the collision-resistance, meaning that
it is computationally infeasible to find a collision—x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that Hk(x) = Hk(x′), even
if the algorithm knows the key k.
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Definition 3 (collision-resistance). Given a hash function (Gen, H), an adversary A is a proba-
bilistic algorithm which takes as inputs the security parameter n and a key k generated by Gen(1n),
and outputs x, x′ ∈ {0, 1}∗. The hash function is collision-resistant if Pr(Hk(x) = Hk(x′)) ≤ t22n for
all probabilistic adversaries A that run in time at most t (where the randomness in this probability
comes from A, not the key generation k ∼ Gen(1n)).
For simplicity, we refer to H or Hk instead of (Gen, H) as a hash function, and all the hash
functions in this paper satisfy collision-resistance. Throughout the paper, we make a standard
assumption that the hash function (Gen, H) can only be accessed as a random oracle [6]. As a
result, for a fixed message x, we assume that the time required to compute the hash value depends
only on n. Moreover, it is infeasible to obtain the value Hk(x) without knowing x.
Definition 4 (Merkle (hash) tree). A Merkle tree is a binary tree in which every internal node
stores the hash value of the concatenation (denoted by symbol ||) of its two children and the leaves
are the hash values of different data blocks.
We are interested in constructing a Merkle treeMT H(T ) for a computation table T . Definition 5
and Fig. 1 illustrates the construction.
Definition 5 (Merkle tree for a computation table). Given a computation table T of a Turing
machineM and a Hash function H, the Merkle tree for T , denoted byMT H(T ), is constructed as
follows.
1. The Lower Part ofMT H(T ): For each row Ti of T , we split it into several data blocks of size
λ, and construct a Merkle treeMT H(Ti) where each leaf is the hash value of a data block.
2. The Upper Part ofMT H(T ): The upper part ofMT H(T ) is a binary tree with T leaves such
that the i-th leaf is the root ofMT H(Ti). Each internal node has value which is the hash value
of the concatenation of its two children as it is in a Merkle tree.
Throughout the paper, we use r to denote the value of the root node ofMT H(T ), ri to denote
the value of the root of the subtree MT H(Ti) which corresponding to the i-th row of T , and
rij to denote the value of the leaf corresponding to the j-th block of the i-row. Denote the j-th
block of the i-row of T by bij , and then rij is the hash value of bij . We use rA, rAi , rAij , bAij to
refer to the corresponding values that Alice provides (which may be subjected to Alice’s strategical
manipulation), and let rB, rBi , r
B
ij , b
B
ij have similar meanings. We sometimes abuse the notations a
little bit and use r, ri, rij to refer to the nodes themselves instead of the values stored in these nodes.
An advantage of the Merkle tree is that we can verify the consistency between a single data
block bAij (or b
B
ij) and the value r
A (or rB) with time complexity only O(log T + logS), as we will
see soon.
Definition 6 (consistent path). GivenMT H(T ) for a computation table T and two nodes u, v of
MT H(T ) such that u is an ancestor of v, we say the path from u to v is consistent if for each
node w on the (shortest) u-v path the value of w is the hash value of the concatenation of the values
stored in w’s children. In particular, for w = v being a leaf, the value must be the hash value of the
corresponding data block.
From the definition above, to check the consistency of a path from u to v, we need the values
of all the nodes on the path and all their children. For example, to check the consistency between
bAij and r
A, we need to check if the path from the root to the leaf corresponding to this data block
is consistent. Since this path has length O(log(ST )) = O(logS + log T ) and each node on the path
has at most two children, this consistency can be checked in time O(logS + log T ).
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Figure 1: Hash Computation Tableau via Merkle Tree
2.2 An Informal Description of Mechanism Design Goals
In this section, we describe some basic game theory concepts as well as our mechanism design goals
in an informal way. Formal definitions of those are deferred to Sect. 4.
Given a game, we define the utility µ of each agent as the payment she receives minus the amount
of effort she spends. For each agent, we define the pure (mixed) strategy s as a mapping such that
s maps every stage of the game and every information set the agent might receive in that stage to
an action (the distribution over all possible actions) in the next stage. In other words, s tells an
agent what to do for every possible situation throughout the game and determines the action (the
distribution over all possible actions) the agent will take at any stage of the game. We call (sA, sB)
a strategy profile of Alice and Bob where sA is Alice’s strategy and sB is Bob’s strategy.
A strategy profile s = (sA, sB) is a Nash equilibrium if neither Alice nor Bob can deviate to
another strategy to obtain a strictly higher utility when s is mutually known by Alice and Bob. We
say a mechanism is truthful if the strategy profile where each of the agents plays a truthful strategy
that always submits the correct answer to the verifier is a Nash equilibrium. We say a mechanism
is strongly truthful if the truth-telling strategy profile is the only Nash equilibrium in some sense.
We have two goals for our mechanism design. Other than the strong truthfulness, our second goal
is that, through an iterative query process, the mechanism must be able to verify the correctness of
the answer that Alice and Bob provide in logarithmic time: O(logS + log T ).
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3 Minimal Refereed Mechanism
Remember that the high level idea is from the prisoner’s dilemma. When Alice and Bob are paid
based on whether they have the same output, they may collude to obtain agreement without exerting
any effort. To solve this “collusion” problem, our minimal refereed mechanism pays an agent who
betrays the collusion and tells the truth a large reward. We also draw on techniques from IP so that
the verification is possible with dramatically fewer resources than the computation itself requires.
Minimal Refereed Mechanism (M, fH(·), AP, d1, d2):
Step 1 The verifier samples a hash key k ∼ Gen(1n) and assigns a programM to both Alice and
Bob and asks them to commit to r = fH(M). We call fH(·) the commitment function, which
is a mapping from a programM to a report profile (a, t, r), where a is the output ofM, t is
the time spent in computingM (i.e., the number of non-blank rows in T ), and r is the value
of the root of the Merkle hash treeMT H(T ), for T being the computation table ofM.
Step 2 (Computation Stage) Alice and Bob do the computation separately and commit rA and
rB to the verifier privately.
Step 3 (Arbitration Stage) If rA = rB, the verifier pays both Alice and Bob the amount d1(t)
that depends on and is monotone in t, the time spent as reported by both agents. Otherwise,
the verifier runs an arbitration process in which the verifier asks both agents several questions
and finally announces for each of Alice and Bob if she(he) is a winner. The verifier pays each
winner d2  d1(T ) and each loser 0 (recall that T is the number of rows in T including blank
rows, which is an upper bound on t).
MRM: Arbitration Process AP The arbitration process shown in Algorithm 1 takes in the
two commitments rA, rB that are different, and outputs either “winner” or “loser” for each of Alice
and Bob. Below we give a verbal summary of Algorithm 1.
When Alice and Bob agree with the value of the root of MT H(T ), then they must disagree
on either a or t. The verifier first checks, in the case tA 6= tB, if the last rows from both agents
contains the halting state, and if the agent reporting the larger running time has a halting state in
the middle row min{tA, tB} (Line 4 to Line 8). Notice that in a correct execution ofM, the halting
state should appear and only appear in the last non-blank row. The arbitration process terminates
immediately if an agent is caught for violating this, and moves on otherwise.
The verifier then asks their values for the root of the subtree corresponding to the min{tA, tB}-th
row (Line 9):
• If they agree with each other, the verifier checks the path from the root of this subtree to the
first block of the min{tA, tB}-th row (Line 11), and announces the winner or the loser based
on if the agent can provide a consistent path (Line 12).
• If they disagree, then the verifier checks the consistency of the path from the root of this
subtree to the root of the entire tree MT H(T ) (Line 14), and announces the winner or the
loser based on the consistency (Line 15).
When Alice and Bob disagree on the value of the root ofMT H(T ), the verifier runs a subroutine
FirstDivergence(rA, rB, r) defined in Algorithm 2 to figure out the first place on which Alice
disagrees with Bob in T (Line 18). The subroutine FirstDivergence takes in three inputs: a hash
value vA, a hash value vB, and a node v in the Merkle tree, where vA and vB are the values Alice
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and Bob provide (respectively) for the node v, and vA 6= vB. It outputs either the identity of the
agents (either one or two) which are identified as “liars”, or a block bij in T . As a brief description,
FirstDivergence travels from the node v to a leaf based on the following rules: at a node u
with children u1, u2 during the traversal, FirstDivergence checks if the hash is consistent, i.e., if
H(uA1 ||uA2 ) = uA and H(uB1 ||uB2 ) = uB, and moves on to the left-most child ui with uAi 6= uBi . If an
inconsistency in the hash computation is found during the traversal, FirstDivergence terminates
and outputs the identity of the agent(s) with the inconsistent computation as the liar(s). Otherwise,
the traversal process will not end until a leaf is reached. This is because we start at v on whose
value Alice and Bob disagree, and Alice and Bob must disagree on at least one of the children
u1, u2 if they disagree on the parent u. When the traversal ends at a leaf rij , assuming both agents
have not broken the hash function, we know that bij is the first block where Alice and Bob disagree.
Intuitively, FirstDivergence performs a binary search, viewing the Merkle tree as the binary search
tree, and checks the consistency of hashing during the search.
If FirstDivergence(rA, rB, r) outputs the identity of the liar(s), the algorithm terminates by
announcing the liar(s) being the loser(s) (Line 20). If the output is a block bij , then we consider
two cases: i = 1 and i > 1.
• If i = 1, i.e., the block is in the first row, since the first row of T encodes the input ofM, it
is easy for the verifier to check the correctness of bAij and b
B
ij by herself (Line 24 and Line 25).
• If i > 1, i.e., the block is in a middle row, the verifier asks Alice and Bob the value of the
corresponding block b(i−1)j in the previous row which contains the active region (Line 27). If
Alice and Bob agree on b(i−1)j , the verifier calculates bij by himself and spot the liar(s) who
has a different value than the verifier (Line 29 and Line 30). If Alice and Bob disagree on
b(i−1)j , the verifier checks the consistency of the path from the leaf r(i−1)j all the way to the
root r of the Merkle tree (Line 32 and Line 33).
Complexity analysis of fH and AP: The time complexity of computing fH is O(S+T logS+T )
since for every i-th, (i + 1)-th row, given the hash tree of the i-th row, we only need to modify
the path from the active region to the root (O(logS)) to obtain the hash tree of (i + 1)-th row.
The time complexity of AP is O(logS + log T ). The main computations are the computation of
FirstDivergece and the consistency check of paths. Both of them require logS + log T time. The
verifier needs O(logS + log T ) space to record the position of the leaf (which represents the path
from the root to that leaf). Thus, a verifier, who has the ability to run a computation that needs
O(logS + log T ) time and O(logS + log T ) space, can run an MRM with AP as the arbitration
process. This shows the achievement of the second goal mentioned in the last section.
4 Mechanism Design Goals Revisited
Under the mechanismMRM(M, fH(·),AP, d1, d2), Alice and Bob are playing a game in the extensive-
form. A strategy s should specify an action at each information set. To make the notion of Nash
equilibrium make sense, we need to define a strategy space which includes all the possible strategies.
This seemly easy task turns out to be tricky. For example, at an information set in the middle of
the arbitration process where the agent must supply the hash value of certain node, s should specify
this value so that the agent can report it to the mechanism. A natural definition for the space of all
possible actions here is the space of all valid hash values: {0, 1}`(n). However, this is problematic:
we know that in this space some of the values make the hashing consistent, and we need to account
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Algorithm 1: The arbitration process AP
1: Input: rA = (aA, tA, rA) and rB = (aB, tB, rB) with rA 6= rB
2: Output: oA, oB ∈ {1, 0} where 1 stands for “winner” and 0 stands for “loser”
3: if rA = rB:
4: if tA 6= tB, assume without loss of generality tA > tB:
5: request values bA
tA,1
, bA
tB ,1
from Alice and value bB
tB ,1
from Bob1
6: if bB
tB ,1
does not contain a halting state: return oA = 1 and oB = 0
7: if bA
tB ,1
contains a halting state or bA
tA,1
does not: return oA = 0 and oB = 1
8: endif
9: let t = min{tA, tB}, and request the values rAt , rBt from both agents
10: if rAt = rBt :
11: request the relevant values and check if the two paths rAt1-rAt and rBt1-rBt are consistent
12: return oA = 1(rAt1-rAt is consistent), oB = 1(rBt1-rBt is consistent)
13: else
14: request the relevant values, and check if the two paths rAt -rA and rBt -rB are consistent
15: return oA = 1(rAt -rA is consistent), oB = 1(rBt -rB is consistent)
16: endif
17: else
18: implement FirstDivergence(rA, rB, r)
19: if the output is the identity of one or two agents:
20: return oA = 1(A is not an output) and oB = 1(B is not an output)
21: else
22: let bij be output of FirstDivergence(rA, rB, r) (we know bAij 6= bBij)
23: if i = 1:
24: request bAij and b
B
ij , and check their correctness
2
25: return oA = 1(bAij is correct) and o
B = 1(bBij is correct)
26: else
27: request bA(i−1)j and b
B
(i−1)j where j-th block in row (i− 1) contains the active region3
28: if bA(i−1)j = b
B
(i−1)j :
29: compute bij from bA(i−1)j = b
B
(i−1)j , and check the correctness of b
A
ij and b
B
ij
30: return oA = 1(bAij is correct) and o
B = 1(bBij is correct)
31: else
32: request the relevant values and check the consistency of rA(i−1)j-r
A and rB(i−1)j-r
B
33: return oA = 1(rA(i−1)j-r
A is consistent) and oB = 1(rB(i−1)j-r
B is consistent)
34: endif
35: endif
36: endif
37: endif
for the cost/effort that agent spends to find those values instead of just “selecting” one of them as
an action. In this section, we aim to provide rigorous definitions for those game theory terms such
as strategy space, utility function, equilibrium concepts, as well as our notions of truthfulness and
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Algorithm 2: Function FirstDivergence(vA, vB, v) in AP
1: Input: a node v, two hash values vA, vB with vA 6= vB
2: Output: a set of liars ` ⊆ {A,B}, or a block bij
3: if v := rij is a leaf:
4: request bAij and b
B
ij
5: if ∃X ∈ {A,B} : H(bXij ) 6= rXij : return ` which includes all such X
6: return bij
7: else
8: let v1, v2 be the children of v, and request vA1 , vA2 , vB1 , vB2 4
9: if ∃X ∈ {A,B} : H(vX1 ||vX2 ) 6= vX : return ` which includes all such X
10: let i = min
i′∈{1,2}:vA
i′ 6=vBi′
i′, and implement FirstDivergence(vAi , v
B
i , vi)
11: endif
strong truthfulness.
We start by defining a strategy. Before this, we adopt a binary string representation of the
position of a node in a binary tree: the root node is represented by the empty string ∅; a string
of length ` represent a node at level ` + 1 such that, in the unique shortest path connecting this
node and the root, the i-th edge in the up-to-down order connects a node to its left child if the i-th
bit of this string is 0, and it connects a node to its right child if the i-th bit is 1. When dealing
with a Merkle tree, we treat a data block bij as the unique child of rij (so that those rij ’s are no
longer leaves, and the leaves are those bij ’s). For example, the node c2 in the tree shown in Fig. 1
is represented by the string 001, and the data block b2 is represented by 00010. For a binary string
p, we denote by pi(p) the node in a binary tree that p represents.
Definition 7 (strategy). A pure strategy s := (sc, sap) is a collection of two deterministic Turing
machines sc, sap where
• sc(M, Hk) takes in a program M and a hash function Hk with key k as inputs, and outputs
a triple (a, t, h) where a is a string, t is a positive integer, and h is a binary string of length
`(n) (where `(·) is the parameter in the hash function, see Definition 2), and
• sap(M, Hk, p, H) takes as inputs a programM, a hash function Hk with key k, a binary string
p, and a string H, and outputs a binary string h,
such that
• when the agent is asked to commit r in the computation stage of MRM, the strategy s specifies
r = sc(M, Hk), and
• when, in the arbitration stage, the agent is request for the hash value of a node (which may pos-
sibly be a data block) inMT H(T ) represented by pi(p), the strategy s specifies sap(M, Hk, p, H),
where the string H records all the historical queries in AP.
1We assume that only the first block in the output row (the last non-blank row) of T is non-blank, as the output
of a program has a small size in most cases. We can, for example, announce an agent as a loser if he provides an
over-sized output.
2The first row encodes the input of the program M, so the verifier can easily check the correctness.
3Occasionally, the active region is at the boundary of the two blocks b(i−1)j and b(i−1)(j±1). In this case we request
two blocks from each agent, and the remaining part of the algorithm stays the same.
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A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the space of all possible pure strategies as it is in
standard game theory.5
Definition 8 (utility and effort). Given a strategy profile (sA = (sAc , sAap), sB = (sBc , sBap)), the
utility of Alice µA(sA, sB) is the expected payment she receives minus the expected effort she spent
on implementing the two Turing mechanisms, where the effort is the total number of the state
transitions in the implementations of sAc , sAap when answering the queries throughout the execution
of MRM (in particular, sAc is implemented exactly once, while the number of implementations of
sAap depends on both sA and sB), and the expectation is taken over the randomness in both the hash
key sampling and the strategies that are possibly mixed. The utility for Bob, µB(sA, sB), is defined
similarly.
Once we have defined strategies and utilities, the definition of Nash equilibrium becomes stan-
dard, so we omit it here.
The natural way to define the truthful strategy is to require that the strategy always specifies
the correct answers in both the computation stage and the arbitration stage. However, under such
definition, it is impossible that the truth-telling profile is the only Nash equilibrium (or MRM is
strongly truthful according to our definition in Sect. 2.2). For example, it will also be a Nash
equilibrium if Bob plays a truthful strategy and Alice plays a strategy that specifies the correct
answers for the computation stage but incorrect answers at a certain information set in the arbi-
tration stage which she believes will never be reached. However, as the verifier’s ultimate goal is
to know the output a of the program M, what we really need is that both agents are honest in
the computation stage only. We discuss in Sect. 6 about other common notions, such as dominant
strategy truthfulness and truth-telling as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and why we do not
use them.
Definition 9 (truthful strategy). A strategy s = (sc, sap) is truthful if sc(M, Hk) = fHk(M).
We use T to denote the set of all truthful strategies. We also define a specific truthful strat-
egy τ = (τc, τap) ∈ T called the absolutely truthful strategy, which, in addition, satisfies that
τap(M, Hk, p, H) outputs the correct hash value of the node pi(p) inMT H(T ) for every p such that
pi(p) ∈MT H(T ).
Definition 10 ((strongly) truthful MRM). The mechanism MRM is truthful if (τ, τ) is a Nash
equilibrium, and is strongly truthful if, in addition, (sA, sB) being a Nash equilibrium implies
sA, sB ∈ T.
Throughout the paper, we use M(i) to denote the (minimum) amount of effort required to
compute the first i rows of T and the Merkle treeMT H(T ), Mc := M(T ) to denote the maximum
effort a truthful agent can spend in the computation stage, andMap to denote the maximum possible
effort a truthful agent can spend in the arbitration stage. In particular, for the absolutely truthful
strategy τ = (τc, τap), the effort of computing τc(M, H) = (a, t, h) isM(t), and we useM τc to denote
this. From our discussion earlier, we have Mc = O(S + T logS + T ) and Map = O(logS + log T ).
4Both Alice and Bob are supposed to construct a Merkle tree for all the T rows in M including those blank
rows after the output row, so the two trees they construct should have the same structure. Therefore, when vA has
children, vB should also have. If this is not the case, we can directly output the agent with incorrect tree structure
as a liar.
5Alternatively, we can view a mixed strategy as at least one of sc, sap being a probabilistic Turing machine.
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5 Strong Truthfulness of MRM
In this section, we prove that the mechanism MRM is strongly truthful with appropriate choices of
parameters.
Theorem 1. For any program M, if we choose large enough security parameter n such that n >
2 log(Mc + Map) + C for some constant C, there exists b such that MRM (M, fH , AP, d1, d2)
with d2 = 2(Mc +Map) + 2b and d1(t) = M(t) + b is strongly truthful, where t is the time spent in
computingM as reported by both agents (their reports are the same if payment d1(·) is considered).
We will prove this main theorem by showing the following four lemmas.
Lemma 1. Given a program M, a hash function (Gen, H) and a pure strategy s = (sc, sap) /∈ T
such that the total effort of computing sc(M, Hk) is strictly less than M τc , there exists  < 1 such
that Prk∼Gen(1n)
(
sc(M, Hk) = fHk(M)
)
< .
Proof. This follows immediately from our assumption that Hk is a random oracle.
Lemma 2. An agent playing the absolutely truthful strategy τ always wins in the arbitration process
AP, regardless of the strategy the other agent plays. Moreover, when the security parameter n is
large enough with n > 2 log(Mc + Map) + 15, if there exists a dishonest agent that plays a pure
strategy s /∈ T and all dishonest agents spend effort at most ζ := 2(n−15)/2, the probability that AP
announces two winners is smaller than δ := 2−10.
Proof. Notice that AP only checks the validity of the halting state, the consistency of certain
selected paths inMT H(T ) and the correctness of a small part of computation (from b(i−1)j to bij),
and only announce a loser if there is any mistake in these. The honest agent playing τ will always
win in AP.
To show the second part, notice that the maximum effort an honest agent spends is at most
M +Map which is strictly less than ζ. Assuming dishonest agents spend effort at most ζ, the total
effort of sA, sB in AP is at most 2ζ < 2(n−10)/2. It is enough to show that, if at least one of sA, sB
is not in T, the event that both agents win in AP implies a collision in the hash function Hk.
We assume for the sake of contradiction that both agents win in AP. When AP is implemented,
we know that rA 6= rB. We consider three different cases: 1) rA 6= rB, 2) rA = rB but tA 6= tB,
and 3) rA = rB, tA = tB, but aA 6= aB.
In the first case, the subroutine FirstDivergence in Line 18 of Algorithm 1 is implemented, and
the consistency of the path from the root r to a leaf rij is checked. The nature of FirstDivergence
ensures rAij 6= rBij . Firstly, we have i > 1, as Alice and Bob, both being winners, should agree on
the first row of T . For i > 1, if both agents also disagree on r(i−1)j , moving from r(i−1)j to the
root along the shortest path, they will eventually agree on the value of a middle node on the path
(otherwise FirstDivergence will never end at bij), this implies a collision. If they agree on r(i−1)j
but disagree on b(i−1)j , then again a collision is found. If the agree on both r(i−1)j and b(i−1)j ,
then at least one of Alice and Bob cannot make the transition b(i−1)j 7→ bij correct, and will be
announced as a loser at Line 30, which contradicts to our assumption that both agents win.
In the second case, both agents will be checked against the halting state validity. Let t =
min{tA, tB} and assume tA > tB. We know that bAt1 6= bBt1 if both agents survive from Line 4 to
Line 8, as bAt1 should not contain a halting state while bBt1 should. If both agents agree on the subtree
root rt, then a collision can be found on the path rt1-rt. If both agents disagree on rt, since in this
case they agree on r, a collision can be found on the path rt-r.
The third case is similar. Since aA 6= aB, we have bAt1 6= bBt1. We can find a collision on either
rt1-rt or rt-r.
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Note that Lemma 2 does not say anything about the situation where both two agents are
dishonest and only one of them wins AP.
Lemma 3. MRM(M, fH , AP, d1, d2) is truthful if d1(t) = M(t) + b, b > δd2 + Mc1− and ζ > d2.
Proof. When Bob plays τ , we need to show that µA(τ, τ) ≥ µA(sA, τ) for any sA, and we can assume
without loss of generality that sA is a pure strategy. If sA ∈ T, then sAc = τc. We know that the
arbitration AP will not be implemented, so Alice receives the same payment and spends the same
effort as she will be when she plays τ .
If sA /∈ T, then the best Alice can hope is that either she has a good guess for the commitment
(with probability bounded by  by Lemma 1) or she is lucky in AP and wins together with Bob
with small effort (with probability bounded by δ by Lemma 2) or she wins together with Bob via ζ
effort. Therefore, µA(sA, τ) ≤ (Mc+b)+(1−) (max{δd2 + (1− δ)0, d2 − ζ}). Simple calculations
reveal that the assumptions b > δd2 + Mc1− and ζ > d2 imply (Mc + b) + (1 − )δd2 < b and
(Mc + b) + (1− )(d2 − ζ) < b. Thus, µA(sA, τ) < b = d1(t)−M(t) = µA(τ, τ).
Lemma 4. MRM(M, fH , AP, d1, d2) is strongly truthful if d1(t) = M(t)+b, d2 = 2(Mc+Map)+2b
for ζ−2(Mc+Map)2 > b >
2δ(Mc+Map)+
Mc
1−
1−2δ > 0.
Proof. It is easy to see ζ > d2. By some calculations, we also have b > δd2 + Mc1− . Thus, we know
MRM is truthful by Lemma 3.
To show MRM is strongly truthful, we consider any (pure or mixed) strategy Nash equilibrium
(sA, sB). We will show that (sA, sB) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if both agents tell the truth
in the computation stage: sA, sB ∈ T.
We classify the possible outcomes of (sA, sB) into the below disjoint cases:
O Alice and Bob agree with each other and both of them tell the truth.
A Alice and Bob agree with each other on correct commitment but at least one of them is dishonest.
A1 Alice is truthful but Bob spends effort less than the effort of τc(M, H).
A2 Bob is truthful but Alice spends effort less than the effort of τc(M, H).
A3 Both Alice and Bob spend effort less than the effort of τc(M, H).
B Alice and Bob agree with each other on a wrong commitment.
C Alice wins in AP via a non-truthful strategy. Bob loses.
D Alice wins in AP via a truth-telling strategy. Bob loses.
E Bob wins in AP via a non-truthful strategy. Alice loses.
F Bob wins in AP via a truth-telling strategy. Alice loses.
G Both lose in AP.
H Both win in AP.
H1 Alice is honest in the computation stage. Bob is dishonest.
H2 Bob is honest in the computation stage. Alice is dishonest.
H3 Both of them are dishonest in the computation stage.
In the remaining part of this proof, when we mentioned probability of certain event, the ran-
domness is from both the hash key generation k ∼ Gen(1n) and the mixed strategy. We will show
that (sA, sB) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if the probability that outcome O happens is 1. The
same arguments in the proof of Lemma 3 show the if direction, so we focus on the only-if direction.
Let M∗ = M + Map be the maximum effort the truth-telling strategy can cost in the whole
MRM game. For convenience, we write Pr(A,B) as the probability event A or event B happens.
Since the cases we consider are disjoint, we can see Pr(A,B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B).
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First of all, any pure strategies that spend effort at least ζ is strictly dominated, since the
maximum possible payment d2 is less than ζ. Therefore, in the remaining part of this proof, we
assume with probability 0 that one of Alice and Bob will spend effort at least ζ.
We compare Alice’s expected utility when Alice plays τ and Bob plays sB with the expected
utility of (sA, sB). Notice that a truthful agent always has utility M(t) + b−M(t) = b if AP is not
launched, and has utility at least d2 −M∗ if AP is launched.
µA(sA, sB)− µA(τ, sB)
≤Pr(A2, A3) · (Mc + b− b) + Pr(B) · (Mc + b− (d2 −M∗))
+ Pr(C) · (d2 − (d2 −M∗)) + Pr(E) · (0− (d2 −M∗)) + Pr(F ) · (0− b)
+ Pr(G) · (0− (d2 −M∗)) + Pr(H2) · (d2 − b) + Pr(H3) · (d2 − (b+ (1− )(d2 −M∗))
Since (sA, sB) is a Nash equilibrium, µA(sA, sB) − µA(τ, sB) ≥ 0. By simplification, rearranging
terms and substituting d2 − (b+ (1− )(d2 −M∗)) < d2 − b (which is straightforward to show) for
the coefficient of Pr(H3), we have
Pr(A2, A3) ·Mc + Pr(C) ·M∗ + Pr(H2, H3) · (d2 − b) ≥
Pr(B) · (d2 −Mc − b−M∗) + Pr(E,G) · (d2 −M∗) + Pr(F ) · b. (1)
Moreover, let Σ be the event that Alice spends effort less than the effort of τc(M, H), we know
Pr(A2, A3) = Pr((A2, A3) ∧ Σ) = Pr(Σ) Pr(A2, A3 | Σ) ≤ Pr(Σ) by Lemma 1, which implies
Pr(B,C,E, F,G,H2, H3) ≥ (1− ) Pr(Σ), and which further implies
Pr(A2, A3) ≤ 
1−  Pr(B,C,E, F,G,H2, H3) =

1−  (Pr(B,C,E, F,G) + Pr(H2, H3)) . (2)
Let Π be the event that Alice is dishonest in the computation stage and AP is implemented. We
know Pr(H2, H3) = Pr((H2, H3)∧Π) = Pr(Π) Pr(H2, H3 | Π) ≤ δ Pr(Π) by Lemma 2 (as mentioned
earlier, we can assume no one spends at least ζ effort), which implies Pr(C,E, F,G) ≥ (1−δ) Pr(Π),
and which further implies
Pr(H2, H3) ≤ δ
1− δ Pr(C,E, F,G). (3)
After replacements according to (2) and (3), we can rewrite (1) as
Pr(C)
(
M∗ +
 ·Mc
1−  +
δ · (d2 − b+ ·Mc1− )
1− δ
)
≥Pr(B)
(
(d2 −Mc − b−M∗)−  ·Mc
1− 
)
+ Pr(E,G)
(
d2 −M∗ −  ·Mc
1−  −
δ · (d2 − b+ ·Mc1− )
1− δ
)
+ Pr(F )
(
b−  ·Mc
1−  −
δ · (d2 − b+ ·Mc1− )
1− δ
)
. (4)
Since b > δd2 + Mc1− , we have the coefficient of Pr(F ) in (4) satisfies b− ·Mc1− −
δ·(d2−b+ ·Mc1− )
1−δ =
1
1−δ
(
b− δd2 − ·Mc1−
)
> 0. This further implies
d2 = 2M
∗ + 2b > 2M∗ + 2
 ·Mc
1−  + 2
δ · (d2 − b+ ·Mc1− )
1− δ , (5)
14
so the coefficients of Pr(G) in (4) is positive. By b > δd2 + Mc1− again and d2 = 2M
∗ + 2b,
(d2 −Mc − b −M∗) − ·Mc1− = b + M∗ −Mc − ·Mc1− > δd2 + M∗ −Mc = δd2 + Map > 0, so the
coefficients of Pr(B) in (4) is also positive. Therefore, we have
Pr(C)
(
M∗ +
Mc
1−  +
δ(d2 − b+ ·Mc1− )
1− δ
)
≥ Pr(E) ·
(
d2 −M∗ − Mc
1−  −
δ(d2 − b+ ·Mc1− )
1− δ
)
. (6)
Symmetrically, by analyzing Bob, we have
Pr(E)
(
M∗ +
Mc
1−  +
δ(d2 − b+ ·Mc1− )
1− δ
)
≥ Pr(C) ·
(
d2 −M∗ − Mc
1−  −
δ(d2 − b+ ·Mc1− )
1− δ
)
. (7)
Equation (5) implies the coefficient of Pr(E) is strictly greater (less) than the coefficient of Pr(C)
in (6) (in (7)), then Pr(C) = Pr(E) = 0 for otherwise (6) and (7) cannot be valid at the same time.
When Pr(C) = Pr(E) = 0, (4) implies that Pr(B) = Pr(F ) = Pr(G) = 0, which, by (2) and (3),
further implies that Pr(A2, A3) = 0 and Pr(H2, H3) = 0. Combining with a similar analysis for
Bob, we will have Pr(O) = 1 in every pure or mixed equilibrium.
Proof for Theorem 1. Equipped with Lemma 4, we only need to show there exists b such that
ζ−2(Mc+Map)
2 > b >
2δ(Mc+Map)+
Mc
1−
1−2δ > 0. The assumption n > 2 log(Mc + Map) + C and the facts
ζ = 2(n−15)/2, δ < 1,  < 1 make sure b’s existence.
We remark that as δ and  go to 0, the surplus payment over the cost of the computation b, can
be arbitrarily small.
6 On Other Notions of Truthfulness
The mechanism MRM is not dominant-strategy truthful (meaning τ or any s ∈ T is a dominant
strategy), unlike the prisoner’s dilemma game. If fixing Bob’s strategy such that Bob only computes
M up to the i-th row and reports it as a, then τ (or any other truthful strategies) is not a best
respond to Alice, as Alice only needs to computeM up to the (i+ 1)-th row (maybe also manually
inserts a halting state in the (i+ 2)-th row) and wins in AP.
Notice also that (τ, τ) is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). For our problem,
SPNE is difficult to achieve, but it is also unnecessary and unnatural in some sense. Consider that
both agents reach an information set in the arbitration process where they have already been asked
the first block of the i-th row, bij , in the computation tableau and they have both agreed on an
incorrect value of bij . The mechanism MRM then checks the first block of the (i+1)-th row, bi(j+1),
to see if both of them agree (if not, the mechanism will compute the Turing machine transition
from the bij to bi(j+1) to verify the correctness). In this case, both agents should report the value
of bi(j+1) computed from bij , instead of the “correct” value of bi(j+1) (meaning the value bi(j+1) if
the program M was executed correctly). An agent who “keeps lying” by computing bi(j+1) based
on the incorrect bij will win if the other agent behaves truthfully.
However, the above situation will never happen for rational agents. Our mechanism is “truthful”
in a natural sense that Nash equilibria are induced at all the information sets along the truthful
equilibrium path (τ, τ). The equilibrium (τ, τ), even though failing to be a SPNE, does not rely on
non-credible threats.
Our notion of strong truthfulness ensures that the mechanism MRM will obtain the correct
output ofM if the two agents are rational (by playing any equilibrium strategy).
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